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Abstract
In this paper the equal split-oﬀ set is introduced as a new solution
concept for cooperative games. This solution is based on egalitarian
considerations and it turns out that for superadditive games the equal
split-oﬀ set is a subset of the equal division core. Moreover, the pro-
posed solution is single valued on the class of convex games and it
coincides with the Dutta-Ray constrained egalitarian solution.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper we propose a new set valued solution concept for cooperative
games with transferable utility that we call the equal split-oﬀ set. This
solution is based on egalitarian considerations and it is inspired by the Dutta-
Ray algorithm for ﬁnding the constrained egalitarian solution for convex
games (cf. Dutta and Ray (1989)).
More precisely, we consider a world N of n players, N = {1,...,n},w h o
believe in equal share cooperation. For each coalition S ⊆ N,l e tt h er e a l
number v(S) represent what the players in S can get if they cooperate (i.e.
v(S) is the worth or the value of coalition S). We assume that the entire set
of players will cooperate and deal with the question how the whole amount
of money v(N) generated by N should be divided among the players by
considering the following step-wise process.
First, one of the coalitions with maximal average worth, say T1, forms and
the players in T1 divide equally the worth v(T1). In step 2 one of the coalitions
in N \ T1 with maximal average marginal worth w.r.t. T1,s a yT2,f o r m s ,
joins costless T1, and divides equally the increase in value v(T2 ∪T1)−v(T1)
among its members. The process stops when a partition of N of the form
hT1,...,T Ki for some 1 ≤ K ≤ n is reached. This procedure generates a
payoﬀ vector x ∈ Rn which we call an equal split-oﬀ allocation. The equal
split-oﬀ set is then deﬁned as consisting of all equal split-oﬀ allocations.
Notice that the diﬀerence between the above procedure and the Dutta-
Ray algorithm for ﬁnding the constrained egalitarian solution for convex
games is that the corresponding selected coalitions need not to be the largest
2coalitions with the highest average worth.
The outline of this paper is as follows. After some preliminaries in Section
2, we introduce the equal split-oﬀ set for superadditive games in Section 3
and study some of its properties on this class of games. It turns out that any
allocation in the equal split-oﬀ set is eﬃcient and individually rational, and,
in addition, it belongs to the equal division core of the corresponding game.
In Section 4 we concentrate on the class of convex games and prove that the
equal split-oﬀ set of a convex game consists of a unique allocation which is
the constrained egalitarian solution of that game. We conclude in Section 5
by pointing out some directions for further research.
2P r e l i m i n a r i e s
A TU-game is a pair (N,v),w h e r eN = {1,...,n} is a set of players and
v:2 N → R is a characteristic function on N satisfying v(∅)=0 .O f t e n ,
we will identify a game (N,v) with its characteristic function v. For any
coalition S ⊆ N, v(S) is the worth of coalition S, i.e. the members of S can
obtain a total payoﬀ of v(S) by agreeing to cooperate.
Ag a m ev is called
• superadditive,i fv(S∪T) ≥ v(S)+v(T) for all S,T ⊆ N with S∩T = ∅;
• convex,i fv(S ∪ T)+v(S ∩ T) ≥ v(S)+v(T) for all S,T ⊆ N.
An allocation in a game v is a payoﬀ vector x ∈ Rn. An allocation of
v(N) such that this amount is cleared is called eﬃcient, and an allocation
x such that xi ≥ v(i) for each i ∈ N is called individually rational.T h e








xi = v(N) and xi ≥ v(i) for each i ∈ N
)
.
Further, an allocation is called stable if any coalition S ⊆ N receives at
least its value v(S).T h ecore C(v) of a game v is the set of all eﬃcient and
stable allocations (Gillies, 1953), i.e. the set
C(v)=
(
x ∈ I(v) |
X
i∈S




For each game v we have that C(v) is a subset of the equal division core
EDC(v) of v. The latter concept was introduced by Selten (1972) as the set
½
x ∈ I(v) | @S ∈ 2
N \{ ∅} s.t.
v (S)
|S|
>x i for all i ∈ S
¾
consisting of all eﬃcient payoﬀ vectors which cannot be improved upon by
the equal division allocation of any subcoalition.
An interesting element of the core C(v) of a convex game v (and, hence,
of EDC(v)) is the Dutta-Ray constrained egalitarian solution DR(v).T h i s
solution consists of the unique allocation in C(v) that Lorenz dominates every
other core allocation. In their seminal paper, Dutta and Ray (1989) provide
an algorithm for generating DR(v) for each convex game v. We apply a
modiﬁed version of the Dutta-Ray algorithm to any superadditive game in
order to produce allocations in the equal split-oﬀ set of v.
3 The equal split-oﬀ set for superadditive games
Let v be a superadditive game and π = hT1,...,T Ki be an ordered partition
of the player set N.W es e tv1 := v,a n df o re a c hk ∈ {2,...,K} we deﬁne
4the marginal game























We call the partition π = hT1,...,T Ki of N a suitable ordered partition





|S| for all k ∈
{1,...,K}.
Given such a partition π,t h eequal split-oﬀ allocation for v generated by




Now we deﬁne the equal split-oﬀ set ESOS(v) of the game v as the set
{x ∈ R
n | ∃π s.t. x is an equal split-oﬀ allocation for v generated by π}.
In order to illustrate this solution concept, let us have a look at the
following examples:
Example 1 (2-person superadditive games) Let v be a game on the player
set N = {1,2} satisfying v(1,2) ≥ v(1) + v (2). Suppose without loss of
generality that v(1) ≥ v(2) and consider the following four cases:
(i) v (1) > 1
2v(1,2).T h e nh{1},{2}i is the unique suitable ordered partition
and ESOS(v)={(v(1),v(1,2) − v(1))};
(ii) v (2) <v(1) = 1






corresponding to the suitable ordered partitions h{1},{2}i and h{1,2}i;
(iii) v(2) = v (1) = 1







{(v(1),v(2))} corresponding to the three suitable ordered partitions h{1},{2}i,
h{2},{1}i,a n dh{1,2}i;
5(iv) v (1) < 1








Example 2 (Simple games) In a simple game v on player set N we have that
for all S ⊆ N, v(S) ∈ {0,1} with v (∅)=0and v(N)=1 . A coalition S ⊆ N
is called minimal winning if v(S)=1and v(S0)=0for all S0 ⊂ S ⊆ N.
Given a simple game v, we denote the set of all minimal winning coalitions
with a smallest cardinality by W s. In the case of simple games ESOS(v)= n
1
|S|eS | S ∈ Ws
o
because for any suitable ordered partition hT1,...,T Ki we
will have T1 ∈ Ws,a n da l lp l a y e r si nT1 will receive 1
|T1| whereas the players
in N \ T1 will receive payoﬀ 0.
Example 3 (Glove games) Let N = L ∪ R, L ∩ R 6= ∅ and the game v be







that can be generated by many suitable ordered
partitions, where each element Tk of such a partition has the property that
|Tk ∩ L| = |Tk ∩ R|.I nc a s e|L| > |R| each element x ∈ ESOS(v) satisﬁes
xi = 1
2 for each i ∈ R and for |R| elements of L,a n dxi =0for the other
elements of L. Conversely, all elements of this type belong to ESOS(v).
One can easily check that the egalitarian split-oﬀ set in Examples 1-3 is
a subset of the imputation set of the corresponding game. This fact turns
out to be true for all superadditive games as is shown in
Proposition 1 Let v be a superadditive game. Then ESOS(v) ⊆ I(v).
Proof. We have to prove that each allocation in ESOS(v) is eﬃcient and
individually rational.











































i.e. x is eﬃcient.
Take now an i ∈ N.W eh a v et op r o v et h a txi ≥ v(i).S u p p o s ei ∈ Tr for




























where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the deﬁnition of Tr and the second
inequality from the superadditivity of v. Hence, x is individually rational.
We conclude that x ∈ I(v), ESOS(v) ⊆ I(v).
Our next proposition shows a monotonicity property of each suitable or-
dered partition of N with respect to a superadditive game.
Proposition 2 Let v be a superadditive game and let hT1,...,T Ki be a suit-













for all k ∈ {1,...,K− 1}.
















































































































































































We show next that the equal split-oﬀ set of a superadditive game is a
reﬁnement of the equal division core of that game.
Theorem 1 Let v be a superadditive game. Then ESOS(v) ⊆ EDC(v).
Proof. Let x ∈ ESOS(v) be generated by the suitable ordered partition
hT1,...,T Ki.T a k e S ∈ 2N \{ ∅}. We have to prove that there is an i ∈ S
such that xi ≥
v(S)
|S| .






































where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the superadditivity of v and the second







|S| for each i ∈ Tm ∩ S.S o ,x ∈ EDC(v), ESOS(v) ⊆ EDC(v).
The next example provides a game for which the equal split-oﬀ set is a
strict subset of the equal division core.
Example 4 Let N = {1,2,3} and v be a glove game with L = {1,2}
and R = {3}.T h e n EDC(v)=
©
















4 The equal split-oﬀ set for convex games
We start this section with a lemma that holds for arbitrary TU-games and
will play an important role when proving that the equal split-oﬀ set of a con-
vex game consists of a single allocation which is the Dutta-Ray egalitarian
solution of that game.
Lemma 1 Let v be a TU-game and let hT1,...,T Ki be a suitable ordered par-
tition of N w.r.t. v by means of marginal games v1,...,v K.L e tTm+1,...,T q
be a sequence of coalitions from the ordered partition such that vi (Ti)=α|Ti|









9Proof. Because vi (Ti)=α|Ti| for each i ∈ {m +1 ,...,q} we have
vm+1 (Tm+1)=α|Tm+1|,
























Let hD1,...,D Pi be the ordered partition of N according to the Dutta-
Ray algorithm for ﬁnding the constrained egalitarian solution DR(v) of a
convex game v.I ne a c hs t e pp ∈ {1,...,P} of the Dutta-Ray algorithm Dp
is the largest element in the set
M




















We recall that for each p ∈ {1,...,P} the set Mp has a lattice structure
w.r.t. the partial ordering of inclusion. So,
Dp = ∪{D | D ∈ M
p}. (#)































The next proposition will play a key role in this section.
10Proposition 3 Let hD1,...,D p,...,D Pi be the ordered partition of N ob-
tained by applying the Dutta-Ray algorithm to a convex game v.L e tT Ã Dp

































= vDp−1(S ∪ T) − vDp−1(T)
= vDp−1(S ∪ T) − dp |T|.
Further, since Dp is the largest set in N \ Dp−1 with average worth dp,
and |S ∪ T| = |S| + |T|,w eh a v e
vDp−1(S ∪ T) <d p (|S| + |T|) if S \ Dp 6= ∅, and
vDp−1(S ∪ T) ≤ dp (|S| + |T|) if S ⊆ Dp,
implying that
vT(S)
|S| <d p if S \ Dp 6= ∅, and
vT(S)
|S| ≤ dp if S ⊆ Dp.
To conclude that (1) and (2) hold we have only to show still that there
is S∗ ∈ 2Dp\T such that vT(S∗)=dp |S∗|.





A * T.T h e n A ⊆ Dp.I f A ∩ T = ∅,w et a k eS∗ = A; otherwise we take



















































∗ ∪ T) − vDp−1(T)
= dp (|S
∗| + |T|) − dp |T| = dp |S
∗|,





and |S∗ ∪ T| = |S∗| + |T|.
We show now that the equal split-oﬀ set of a convex game consists of a
unique allocation which is precisely the constrained egalitarian solution of
that game.
Theorem 2 Let v be a convex game. Then ESOS(v)={DR(v)}.
Proof. Let hD1,...,D Pi be the ordered partition of N a c c o r d i n gt ot h e
Dutta-Ray algorithm for ﬁnding the constrained egalitarian solution DR(v)=
(DRi(v))i∈N of v.L e thT1,...,T Ki be a suitable ordered partition of N with
respect to v for ﬁnding the allocation x =( xi)i∈N in the equal split-oﬀ set
ESOS(v) of v.W eh a v et os h o wt h a tx = DR(v).
We prove by induction that for each k ∈ {1,...,K} the following property
(Pk) holds:




Dsk,a n dxi = DRi(v) for each i ∈∪ k
r=1Tr.
First, note that (P1) holds with s1 =1 . Indeed T1 ⊆ D1 since T1,D 1 ∈ M1
and D1 = ∪{D | D ∈ M1},s oxi = DRi(v)=d1 for each i ∈ T1.
12Further, we prove that (Pq) implies (Pq+1) for each q ∈ {1,...,K− 1}.






p=1Dp.I n t h i s c a s e Tq+1,D sq+1 ∈ Mq+1 and
¯ ¯Dsq+1
¯ ¯ ≥
|Tq+1|. Therefore, (Pq+1) holds with sq+1 = sq+1,a n dTq+1 ⊆ Dsq+1 because
Dsq+1 = ∪{D | D ∈ Mq+1}.H e n c e ,xi = DRi(v) for each i ∈∪
q+1
r=1Tr because





p=1Dp. We prove that in this case (Pq+1) holds with




j=1 Dj and for each i ∈ {m +1 ,...,q},
Ti ( Dsq and vDsq−1 (Ti)=dsq |Ti|.
Then for T = ∪
q
i=m+1Ti ( Dsq we have by Lemma 1 that vDsq−1 (T)=
dsq |T|. Now we apply Proposition 3 with sq i nt h er o l eo fp, obtaining that
Tq+1 ⊆ Dsq and vDsq−1 (Tq+1)=dsq |Tq+1|. Therefore, (Pq+1) holds with
sq+1 = sq and Tq+1 = Dsq,a n dxi = DRi(v) for each i ∈∪
q+1
r=1Tr.
Since (Pk) holds for each k ∈ {1,...,K}, we conclude that each suitable
ordered partition hT1,...,T Ki of N w.r.t. a convex game v is a reﬁnement of
the Dutta-Ray partition hD1,...,D Pi of v.S p e c i ﬁcally, there exist l1,...,l P
such that D1 = ∪
l1
r=1Tr,D 2 = ∪
l2
r=l1+1Tr,...,D P = ∪
lP
r=lP−1+1Tr,w i t hlP = K,
implying that ESOS(v)={DR(v)}.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In Section 3 of this paper the equal split-oﬀ set has been introduced on
the class of superadditive games as a new set valued solution concept based
on egalitarian considerations. We have proved that for any superadditive
game the new solution concept contains only allocations which are eﬃcient
13and individually rational, and that it is a reﬁnement of the equal division
core. Further, in Section 4, we have proved that for each convex game the
equal split-oﬀ set consists of a single allocation which is the Dutta-Ray con-
strained egalitarian solution for that game. When the game v is not su-
peradditive we can extend the equal split-oﬀ set to arbitrary TU-games by
deﬁning ESOS(v): =ESOS(v),w h e r ev denotes the superadditive cover of
the game v and study properties of the equal split-oﬀ set in this more general
setting. Another interesting topic for further research is the relation between
the equal split-oﬀ set and the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and
Ray for superadditive games, when the latter solution exists. Further inves-
tigations should be done for clarifying possible relations between the equal
split-oﬀ set and existing egalitarianism-based solution concepts for arbitrary
TU-games such as the strong-constrained egalitarian allocations (cf. Dutta
and Ray (1991)), the egalitarian set, the preegalitarian set and the stable
egalitarian set (cf. Arin and Inarra (2002)) and for balanced games like the
Lorenz solution (cf. Hougaard et al. (2001)), the Lorenz stable set and the
egalitarian core (cf. Arin and Inarra (2001)).
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